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Abstract
Pupils’ expectation-related errors oppose the development of an appropriate scientific attitude towards empirical evidence and the learning of accepted science content, representing a hitherto neglected area of research in science education. In spite of these drawbacks, a pedagogy is described that encourages pupils to allow their biases to improperly influence data collection and interpretation during practical work, in order to provoke emotional responses and subsequent engagement with the science. The usefulness of triggering emotion in order to facilitate learning is borne out quantitatively by findings from a series of three randomised experiments (n=158) which show superior gains using this pedagogy that are still significant two and three years after the initial treatment. In addition, pupils who experienced more intense emotions during treatment demonstrated the most gains in the medium term. This research is one element of a long-term study of expectation-related observation in school science whose findings impact generally on the proper consideration of empirical evidence and the learning of science content.

Introduction
Professional scientists can be susceptible to personal bias when collecting data (Mahoney, 1979), indeed, an aim of peer assessment prior to publication of findings in scholarly journals is the checking of methods, results and inferences for predisposed, sometimes unconscious influences towards a foregone conclusion. Taken to extremes such biases manifest themselves as scientific fraud​[1]​ where researchers deliberately set out to deceive for monetary and other motives, such as a ‘…blinding commitment to a particular paradigm’ (Nott and Smith, 1995, p407).

A common assumption associated with school science practical work is that young experimenters observe and report natural phenomena faithfully. The possibility that pupils can, as some scientists have done, allow predilection towards a favoured conclusion to influence their data collection and reporting, is rarely considered by teachers (Author, 2006), and represents a neglected area of science education research. Traditionally, the literature has been equivocal regarding the validity of comparisons of school pupils with professional scientists, with some workers making direct parallels between the behaviours and attitudes of the two groups (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Chinn and Brewer, 1998; Driver, 1983; Karmiloff-Smith, 1988); conversely, others deny similarities on the grounds of incomparable maturation of scientific thinking skills and domain-specific knowledge (Chi, 1978; Kuhn, 1989). The current research focuses on psychological processes that are fundamentally and universally human, specifically the wilful or subconscious influences of desirable outcomes on behaviour and perceptions - forms of ‘wishful thinking’. This psychology develops spontaneously (Gilovich, 1991) and within limits, is largely independent of experience having been demonstrated in populations of varied age, and so has relevance to both school pupils and scientists. This article examines the possibility of using these often-troublesome qualities in a positive sense to promote engagement during science lessons.

School pupils, often surreptitiously, though sometimes without being themselves aware will record observations that do not reflect the reality of physical phenomena under study. Leanne (12 years old) compared the masses of two beakers holding equal volumes of a different liquid - one contained saltwater, the other, distilled water. When asked to use the electronic balance to measure the masses she declared that this was not necessary, as she already knew the saltwater beaker was the heavier. Holding each beaker in either hand, she affirmed, 

‘I can tell by the weight’ (Leanne).

The 5g of salt in the saltwater beaker contributed only 3% towards the total mass of the system, and the mass difference between the two beakers was too small to be within the limits of human perceptual abilities.​[2]​ When challenged about the certainty of her observation,

‘I’m really sure – I felt my arm starting to drop because of the extra weight’ (Leanne).

Leanne’s anticipation of the (scientifically correct) result of the saltwater beaker being the heavier had led her to either knowingly submit a false report or experience an unconscious perceptual modification that made it appear to her that there was indeed a noticeable difference between the two beakers - a kind of scientific illusion. This is a well-studied psychological event, though infrequently cited in the science education literature.

‘Truly ambiguous information is often simply perceived in a way that fits our preconceptions’ (Gilovich, 1991, p52).

It is proposed that such expectation-related observations (EROs) are commonplace in school science classrooms. Further examples described by Author (2006) include:

	On wrapping wool around a container of water at ambient temperature, a rise of 5°C is recorded
	When two marbles of different size are dropped simultaneously, the heavier is repeatedly seen to land first
	The north pole of a magnet is the more powerful, attracting objects with greater force
	A balloon inflated with air feels far lighter than one that is deflated
	Acids with low pH values cause less fizzing when mixed with marble chips

EROs can be viewed as an unwanted aspect of experimentation primarily because they signal an unscientific method of working. In addition, if observers’ preconceptions are aligned with theories not currently accepted by science, EROs end up as being apparent empirical confirmations of misconceptions. That said, the current study examines the possibility that the encouragement of EROs can be useful for learners’ lasting rejection of the very misconceptions that were the source of the biases.

Chinn and Brewer (1998) review previous studies (e.g. Chan, Burtis and Bereiter, 1997; Inagaki, 1981; Johsua and Dupin, 1987) that have utilised anomalies, in the form of experimenters’ unanticipated results to facilitate learning in a Piagetian sense, creating cognitive disequilibrium in order that old concepts are replaced with new, scientifically acceptable variants. Most of this work is aligned with the conceptual change paradigm. Allied to this approach is the familiar pedagogic technique of teaching through bluff, a quite instinctive practice found at grass roots level in the repertoires of teachers who may have little knowledge of science education research pertaining to anomalies. The teacher might hold up an inflated and a deflated balloon to show a class, playing devil’s advocate and incorrectly inferring ‘the inflated balloon is lighter…yes?’ to which many in the class voice agreement, so revealing their status as misconceivers. Thereafter, weighing the balloons refutes this erroneous theory, and emotions such as surprise, awe and puzzlement that are generated enhance engagement and thus the chance of meaningful learning. 












Before observation can take place some expectation of what is going to happen needs to be present in the observer’s mind so that perceptual apparatus can focus upon relevant aspects of the system. Thus, all observed data are not pure, unbiased recordings but are tainted by and are only as reliable as the theory​[4]​ held by the observer (Hodson, 1986). These theories influence firstly how an observer goes about collecting data, governing experimental set up, measuring techniques and observation selection, and secondly may have some bearing on perception itself, a consequence of which might be illusory experiences. Theory dependence can make a scientist record erroneous observations if the theoretical standpoint is incorrect (ibid.). Competing theories can accordingly induce different observations of the same phenomenon because observation statements use concepts that are rooted in each particular theory - the Aristotelian and Galilean theories of falling bodies both focused on the same, easily-reproducible behaviour of objects in free-fall, though both cited different and contradictory empirical data (Kuhn, 1996). 

Since all observation is theory dependant a scientist is inescapably bound to some expectation of a particular outcome during an experiment. That said, this mind-set is by no means automatically a precursor of self-fulfilling prophesy, as the methods of science promote the negating of these potentially-biasing influences, providing for objective measurement/examination that will accurately capture the reality of phenomena to such a degree as the apparatus and methods allow. It is when these checking mechanisms break down that prejudiced experimenting is allowed to flourish, and an expectation-related observation (ERO) may be defined as the biased collection or interpretation of data, influenced by a desire to reach a predetermined conclusion. Proper science keeps this potentially spoiling consequence of theory dependence in check; historically, unscientifically strong allegiances to ‘incorrect’ prior theories have culminated in ‘incorrect’ inferences, aligned with those theories. Note that theory dependant observation and expectation-related observation are far from being analogues, the former representing an inevitable quality of perception, the latter an unwanted effect arising from failure to temper subjective desires.

‘Observations are theory-dependent. Students' personal theories affect what they see’ (Gunstone, 1991, p71).







	A different POE study (Gunstone, Mitchell and the Monash Children's Science Group, 1988) gives an account of observers expecting the combined mass of a rotting piece of liver plus its sealed jar to decrease due to belief of the misconceptions that rotting material loses matter and/or gases have no weight. The discovery of no weight loss brought suggestions that the experiment failed because air must have leaked in. Chinn and Brewer (1998) correspondingly found that responses to anomalous data fell into categories such as doubting/disbelieving the data, proposition of faulty method and criticising the expertise of the experimenter. 

These two accounts locate the essence of ERO behaviours and are typical of others in the literature where students have neglected anomalous data, either failing to notice or ignoring unexpected outcomes, or acknowledging though later dismissing them as being irrelevant to the overall conclusion (Driver, 1975, 1983; Gunstone and White, 1981; Hesse, 1987; Zimmerman, Raghavan and Sartoris, 2003). 

Three studies report specifically on the heavy/fast misconception that is the focus of the current research. Champagne, Gunstone and Knopfler (1985) found when weights of differing mass were dropped and landed simultaneously, some observers suggested that the blocks must have actually been equal in mass, while others said the heavier block did land first but the difference was too small to be perceptible. Gunstone and Watts (1985) describe how when a bright student predicted that an aluminium cube would hit the floor before a plastic cube, and although most of the class observed the two arrive at the floor together, swore the aluminium cube hit first. When asked to give a reason for the phenomenon he said simply ‘Newton's law’ (ibid., p87) as if to give his observation credibility by reference to an accepted doctrine. Gunstone (1994) reports that 63% of DipEd students who predicted a shot put would hit the ground before a rubber ball dropped from the same height also observed this outcome, when in actuality the balls landed at the same time, showing that far from being exclusive to younger learners these qualities prevail with advanced students of science who have proved through examination their knowledge and understanding. Indeed, a series of studies have identified the heavy/fast misconception in such diverse populations as 11 year-olds, physics undergraduates, postgraduate teacher-trainees and non-student adults, and in frequencies of up to 91% (Champagne, Klopfer and Anderson, 1980; Gunstone, 1994; Gunstone and White, 1980, 1981; Oakes, 1945; Osborne, 1984). 

Conceptual change studies/social influence
There is a long tradition of misconception research carried out under the aegis of the conceptual change paradigm (Duit and Treagust, 2003, offer an exceptional exposition of prior work). Misconception Intervention lessons were devised using conceptual change findings as a source (including Driver, 1983; Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer and Scott, 1994a; Driver, Guesne and Tiberghien, 1985; Harlen, 1999; Jofili, Geraldo and Watts, 1999; Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog, 1982; Shakespeare, 2003; Treagust and Tsui, 2004; Watson, Swain and McRobbie, 2004; Watson and Wood-Robinson, 1998; Watts and Bentley, 1991). The view that anomalies can arouse cognitive conflict and subsequent rejection of a misconception theory in favour of the scientific alternative lies at the core of the system, as do social influences on learning as originally espoused by Vygotsky (1978) that assume a constructivist epistemology where knowledge can only be assembled via verbal/written exchanges with other people, thus scientific theories are not absolute revelations of observed reality, but social constructions. MI lesson design takes the form of the presentation of anomalies in a social context, requiring that all participants interact during the declaration and debate of their theory of choice, and it is proposed that powerful, frequently irresistible social pressures become evident particularly at the closing stages that force the choosing of the accepted, scientific theory and rejection of misconceptions. Within the few references to EROs that exist in the literature, the influence of social factors during scientific observation hardly merits a mention.

Practical work facilitates theoretical understanding
The utilisation of practical work to augment the teaching of scientific theory has opponents as well as proponents, with some advocating the usefulness of an authentic, hands-on experience (Atkinson, 1990; Gott and Duggan, 1995; Millar, 1989) and others challenging whether substantive conceptual entities are adequately constructed or confronted as a result (Erickson, 1994; Hodson, 1993; Watson, 2000). Conceptual change studies have utilised practical activities during attempts to teach accepted science and rectify misconceptions, with mixed success (Carmichael, Driver, Holding, Phillips, Twigger and Watts, 1990; Driver, Squires, Rushworth and Wood-Robinson, 1994b), and the current study seeks to investigate the claim that an MI lesson could realise similar goals of successful rejection of misconceptions and construction of accepted concepts contextualised in a practical setting. More specifically, and in line with the format of the current work, there have been a few prior studies concerned with the presentation of anomalies by means of practical activities in order to achieve successful learning (Lawson, 1995; Osborne and Wittrock, 1983; Renner, Abraham and Birnie, 1988).

The affectual factor
The facilitative link between emotion and memory has been well established (e.g. Davidson and Jergovic, 1996; Hertel and Parks, 2002), and learning activities designed to access affect have been shown to be successful educational tools. Jerusalem and Pekrun (1999) state how joy during learning is associated with performance situations; Nisbett and Ross (1980) report that evidence that is more vivid or stands out in an individual's memory is likely to be given disproportionate value – it appears the brain preferentially stores information that is significantly more emotionally loaded (Bromm and Desmedt, 1995). Both positive and negative emotions are thought to play a part,

‘Hope of success, pride, taking joy in success, fear of failure, or indifference and low level anxiety in relation to lack of success are seen as particularly motivating for achievement’ (Laukenmann, Bleicher, Fub, Glaser-Zikuda, Mayring and von Rhoneck, 2003, p490).

Alternatively, in some contexts affect may have a debilitating or reconstructive effect on memory as in the case of acute emotional trauma inducing memory repression; the psychology and psychiatry literatures widely report instances of psychogenic amnesia in response to distressing life events such as childhood sexual abuse (discussed by Wessel and Wright, 2004). Of course, these extreme conditions have little relevance to the formal learning situations applicable to the current research.

MI lessons employ bluff activities, that were thought to be affectually arousing, in attempts to excite learners, fostering attachment to personal theory and provoking them into committing EROs (Author, 2006, 2007). In addition, it was hypothesised that increasing affect might help make the experience less forgettable for learners, making the content appear more relevant, interesting and engaging (Alsop, 2001), allowing memories to be laid down and subsequently recalled to a greater extent. The current study attempts to quantify the emotional experience of each learner in the search for associations between affect and other variables such as achievement and EROs. 

Summary
A few prior workers have noted the presence of EROs in school science settings. The format of Misconception Intervention lessons draws on research from a variety of disciplines, considering the processes and findings of conceptual change, practical science, social constructivism and emotion-mediated learning; in order to firstly test the effectiveness of this approach, and secondly study the possible influences MI lessons might have on pupil affect, an experimental method is described hereafter. Educational experiments have been employed as assessment devices to compare the relative effectiveness of different science pedagogies in correcting misconceptions (such as Asami, King and Monk, 2000; Chang and Barufaldi, 1999), and the current research similarly comprises of an experimental comparison of an MI lesson with a ‘typical’ science practical lesson, with each approach focusing in its own way on phenomena related to the influence of mass on gravitational attraction. 

Participants and setting
The research took place in two different English state-maintained schools. School A was a mixed gender non-selective secondary-modern type institution in the south east of England catering for ages 11-16 years. The mean ability of school A’s pupils was lower than the national average due to nearby selective grammar schools drawing off the most able 10-20% of children. School B in contrast was a mixed gender non-selective middle school also in the south east of England, responsible for the education of children of ages 9-13 years. Most of the intake derived from a nearby affluent village and consequently overall achievement was higher than the national average. 

Table 1 give the number and composition of each of the samples accrued for the research. The three experiments involved a total of 158 pupils.

Method
	As stated, the driving force behind the current research was a test of the efficacy of MI lessons in correcting misconceptions, a hitherto unknown quality, thus the major research question formally enquired if pupils experienced a Misconception Intervention lesson, were they more likely to subsequently recall correct science than if they attended a similar, transmission-style practical lesson? There were a number of subsidiary questions that focused on affectual differences, including: would one lesson incite a greater frequency or depth of emotion in pupils? To realise these, three educational experiments were performed with treatment and control groups being subjected to two distinct ways of teaching, MI or transmission lesson, and the effects on pupils’ learning were studied in an effort to determine if either way was superior to the other. Specifically, the experiments should determine which approach, if any, is the more effective at dispelling the heavy/fast misconception. Additionally, associations of the misconception variable were to be made with other factors, namely pupil ability, individual emotional intensity and EROs. Strongly EROing pupils were determined using a quantity - the AE​[5]​ variable - that took into account the depth of commitment to one particular theory.

	The experiments were of classical pre-test /post-test control group design, also known as a 'true' experimental design (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000) or randomised experiment (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2001); a two-group design negates any interaction effects due to the pre-test influencing participants’ performance in the post-test of a single-group experiment (ibid.). Subjects were matched by ability​[6]​ and assigned to one of two groups using a random process. Pupils were not matched by age as the sample was drawn from a single year group, there being potentially a maximum difference of 11 months between the oldest and youngest pupil, a situation not deemed as representing a significant threat to validity due to maturation effects. No data were available relating to socio-economic class. Once created, each group was randomly designated to either undergo treatment or control, and after matching, the gender makeup of treatment/control groups was found to be suitably balanced. The aim of such random assignment is to create two groups that are probabilistically similar, thus any observed differences after treatment is likely to be due to the treatment itself and not differences between the groups. The sampling procedure followed the tenets of purposive sampling by typical instances as described by Shadish et al. (2001).

	Similarities with a recent investigation of ecology concepts can be made with the current research, as Ozkan, Tekkaya and Geban (2004) used a treatment/control group experimental design with pre-tests / post-tests and class sizes of 28 and 30. However, the study utilised unchanged intact classes, a position avoided in the current research due to the possibility of confounding independent variables such as the prior experiences of one group giving them an advantage during testing. Such quasi-experimental designs are more usual in education research and easier logistically since new groups do not have to be created, but findings lose validity due to the presence of confounds (Cohen et al., 2000). The true, randomised design was seen as a strength of the current study, since there is a dearth of randomised experiments in the science education literature.

	Pupils worked in pairs for both treatment and control lessons. Each lesson took place simultaneously in different classrooms and was taught by different members of staff.

Experiment hypothesis - The treatment (MI) group will demonstrate a significantly higher learning gain than the control (transmission) group.





The Misconception Intervention lesson Marble drop was carried out with a pre-test and a post-test completed at the start and at the end of the lesson, respectively. Each lesson was one hour in duration. The MI approach begins with the teacher setting the scene by offering a scenario, which in the case of Marble drop took the form of a hypothetical question: if a heavy man and a light man jump off a cliff into the sea at the same time, who will make the first splash? Simultaneously and as a demonstration, the teacher physically dropped a large and small marble at the same time. Pupils were then invited to predict what the ‘right answer’ will be, choosing one of three mutually exclusive theories: big marble, small marble or the scientifically correct same. In order to purposely elicit misconception theories and thus subsequent EROs, at this point a red herring was fed in by the teacher: it may help you to imagine who would make the bigger splash…

Predictions were then verbally shared with the class as each pair called out loud their predicted theory, which was recorded by the teacher on an overhead transparency (OHT) in full view. This important step allows the general consensus of the class to be made publicly explicit, having influences on the social acceptance of favoured theories, becoming particularly important later during the lesson. These social factors are considered vital for the facilitation of misconception rejection and the acceptance of accepted scientific theory, as reflected by the phenomenon of free-falling marbles of differing size. 

Each group were given a big and small marble and the practical phase began. Four activities were carried out, the aim of each being to determine which marble, big or small, falls the faster. The first activity was Which looks faster, and involved dropping each marble singly in turn (not simultaneously) and making an assessment as to which one appears to be falling more quickly. The result was written down by each pair and verbally shared with the class, being recorded on OHT as was the prediction. The poor resolution of this first activity makes a clear observation difficult for pupils, who may be encouraged due to a theory-laden mind-set to revert to their theory choice as elicited during the prediction phase, as many did. Data from the long term study (Author, 2006) suggest some pupils who make such EROs can consciously submit a false report, choosing to fall back on their prediction when in actuality there was no perceived difference between the speeds of the two marbles. Others merely look to see what everyone else is getting, and amend their result accordingly. Most interestingly, a minority of pupils actually believe they see one marble falling significantly faster repeatedly, and it is postulated this group of illusion-observers are pupils most hooked on theory-dependence.

The activities continued, though each one progressively provided better-resolved observations so making the scientific phenomenon as expressed by the same theory difficult to ignore. The fourth and final activity Card tunnel is especially lucid, and involves the two marbles being held in apparatus that allows a reliable simultaneous release and produces a single audible sound that is clearly suggestive of both marbles landing at the same time. Pupils were then given the opportunity to make a final choice of theory, examining their own data and those of other pairs in order to come to a decision. Revelation of the ‘right answer’ was achieved by teacher demonstration involving datalogger light gates, showing no discernable differences between the falling speeds of the two marbles.

The control lessons.
These took the form of a ‘typical’ transmission-style lesson that involved a circus of four practical activities that had ‘speed of falling’ as its central theme, and were one hour in duration. Similarly, pre and post-tests were administered. Each control lesson began with the teacher explaining to pupils how to carry out each of the four activities, thereafter, pupils were allowed to complete the activities in their own time and in no specified order, in pairs, moving from station to station throughout the lesson. 

Activity one involved timing an series of objects of increasing mass sliding down an inclined slope to see if mass influenced speed down the slope. The second activity required pupils to time the descent of three different-sized card ‘skydivers’ from a fixed point, to determine whether surface area had any effect on rate of fall. The third was a simple exercise where participants recorded the weight as indicated by a Newtonmeter of an incrementally increasing load of 100g masses, essentially converting grams into Newtons. The fourth activity was a marble drop, requiring pupils to simultaneously release a big and small marble and record which, if any, landed first. It was planned that pupils spend an approximately equal amount of time on each of the four circus activities, with results being recorded on worksheets given to each pupil at the start of the lesson.

As is usual with circus lessons, ten minutes from the end of the lesson pupils were asked to bring their experimenting to a close and gather as a class as the teacher talked through the practical activities, inviting pairs to comment on their results, and finally revealing the scientific answer in each case.

The assumption was made that the control lesson represented a typical non-constructivist transmission-type practical lesson as experienced by pupils in English secondary schools that alongside other aims attempts to refute the heavy/light misconception, and the activities contained therein would probably be familiar to readers who are experienced science teachers. Indeed, school B employed an almost identical lesson as part of the established scheme of work that involved a circus where different aspects of physical phenomena centred on gravity as a theme, including parachutes, inclined slopes and free-falling objects.








Each pupil completed three written tests, a pre-test, a post-test and a delayed post-test; the Experiment One and Two participants also underwent a second delayed post-test. Both treatment and control pupils experienced the same tests, under examination conditions. The answers to the tests were not communicated to the pupils after completion, apart from in some instances after the delayed post-test, as a few pupils had asked what the answer actually was, and since this had occurred at the end of the research it had no bearing on the results.

Pre-test.
Carried out at the start of the lesson. This consisted of three questions concerned with gravity, only one of which tested the heavy/fast misconception that was being targeted by both the MI and treatment lessons, called the critical question, and with the remaining two questions acting as filler (see figure 5; Q3 is the critical question). 

A detailed and descriptive study of the heavy/light misconception and the scientifically correct same theory as constructed by participants was not an aim of the research; neither were the relationships, albeit interesting, between these entities and the wider conceptual frameworks in which they might be embedded, and previous workers (e.g. Champagne et al., 1980) have provided such accounts using data collected by extended interview methods. In the current research, examination of pupils’ ideas took a pragmatic stance in the sense that an immediate concern was how learners holding the heavy/light misconception might perform in formal testing, such as Key Stage Three National tests​[7]​ and General Certificate in Secondary Education (GCSE).​[8]​ Thus, the tests utilised during the current research took on a style of questioning found in these contexts, essentially a superficial though valid examination of whether pupils could effectively use this single concept to successfully address a multiple-choice response question (figure 5).







Carried out at the end of each lesson, except in one experiment when it was completed 24 hours after the lesson. Like the pre-test, the post-test consisted of three questions on gravity, including one question that tested the misconception under study, the second critical question. The post-test questions were not the same as those that were in the pre-test, except with one experiment where the post-test consisted of a repeat of the pre-test, plus the three new questions.

Delayed post-test.
Carried out approximately six weeks after each experiment in order to examine medium-term learning. The content of the delayed post-tests was varied, two being a repeat of the original pre-test, the other simply the pre-test critical question.

With the first and second experiments, an additional second delayed post-test was carried out three and two years respectively after the original experiment to examine long-term learning effects, and consisted of a repeat of the previous six-week delayed post-test.

Emotion matrix







Data are presented in the form of a particulars table that summarises the context of each experiment, inter-group differences and intra-group gains (table 1). 

	Ability equivalence – t-tests CAT SAS values of each group to check that one is not unfairly more able than the other
	Gains – shows the progress of each group since the start of the experiment, using pre-test scores as a baseline and expressed as a percentage







With each of the three experiments the abilities of treatment and control groups were found to be equivalent with relation to both CAT SAS score and pre-test score, thus any superior gains by a particular group could not have been due to differences in ability.  

If the assumption that all variables bar type of lesson had been controlled is valid, then the superior gains of the treatment group in all three experiments show that the MI lesson was more successful than the control lesson in teaching the correct scientific conception, thus conversely the frequencies of the heavy/fast misconception were higher with control. This conclusion holds at the time of administration of post-test (immediately following the lesson, or with Experiment One, 24 hours later), delayed post-test​[9]​ (six weeks later) and second delayed post-test (Experiments One and Two only, three and two years later, respectively). Therefore, the null hypothesis may be rejected. Similar results gained in two very different schools endorse the generalisability of these claims, as does the fact different teachers achieved comparable success when delivering the same treatment MI lesson. Throughout analysis there were no significant findings with regard to the gender variable.






Analysis of the emotion matrix questions






Both treatment and control groups were equivalent with respect to individuals’ emotion scores (t= - 0.91, df=48, α=0.37, two tailed).   

There were no affectual differences between correct and incorrect pupils of both treatment and control groups at post-test (t= 0.44, df=31, α=0.66, two tailed, unequal variances).   

At delayed post-test, the correct pupils from the treatment group had experienced higher intensity of affect compared with incorrect pupils of the same group (t= - 2.86, df=23, α=0.009, two tailed).  There were no differences within the control group (t= - 0.75, df=21, α=0.46, two tailed, unequal variances).

Affect was not associated with ability (r= 0.0067, v= 48, α = > 0.1).

Affect was not associated with the Absolute EROing (AE) variable (t= - 1.16, df=23, α=0.26, two tailed).

Discussion
Using anomalous data in an attempt to facilitate conceptual change is not a novel approach. That said, utilising a series of bluff activities where learners are encouraged to make their own errors and experience illusions is innovative, and the literature does not reference the triggering of expectation-related observation as a pedagogical tool. 

As is the case with simple bluff demonstrations, it was intended that MIs elicit strong attachment to misconception theories and so subsequent revelation of the acceptable science would be all the more surprising, and so memorable. As an adjunct, the MI approach was devised to initiate emotional stimulation during all phases of the lesson, from affection towards the initial prediction, to the pleasure of collecting evidence that confirm the prediction while committing EROs, and finally to the thrill experienced while watching the teacher reveal the scientific answer at the end that verifies the pupil’s status as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. At the end of Experiment Three pupils from both treatment and control groups completed the emotion matrix, a short questionnaire that had been previously utilised in a separate phase of the long-term ERO study. As experiencing emotion can generally assist memory, and since the treatment groups had made larger conceptual gains than the control groups, the former might be expected to report greater affect. In spite of this anticipation, analysis shows that although the treatment group reported more intense emotions than control, the difference was not significant. This was interesting, since the items in the matrix were developed from emotions reported previously during MI lessons only, the fact the control pupils reported the same emotions at equivalent levels indicates a commonality of affectual experience that traverses these two diverse approaches to practical work.

In addition to this, pupils from both treatment and control groups who had answered the critical question correctly during the post-test did not experience any more emotion than incorrect pupils, showing that affect was not associated with more effective learning at the stage immediately following the experiment. However, by the time of the delayed post-test six weeks later the more emotional learners from the treatment groups only had fared better, achieving significantly more correct responses. It appears that for the learners who experienced the most emotion during the MI lesson conceptual change is more robust compared with less emotional peers who had achieved well at post-test due to the application of shorter-term memory mechanisms (post-test took place around 5 minutes after revelation in two experiments, and 24 hours later in the other), though reverted to initial misconceptions at some time after the lesson. There were no ability differences along the emotional continuum, denying the possibility that the more emotional pupils recalled better because they were also more able. Thus, it is tentatively proposed that the superior gains of the treatment groups are a consequence of greater engagement with the science that results from emotional stimulation triggered during the treatment lessons. 

emotion → enhanced learning





Consequently, a plausible mechanism explaining the comparative success of MI lessons could be,
 
ERO → emotion→ enhanced learning

This model implies that pupils who were committing strong EROs would also experience the most emotion, however, this was not the case with the three experiments of the current research, as data indicate that most of the pupils experienced strong emotions during the lessons, with some managing to control their feelings and observe without bias, and others failing in this respect and submitting to EROs. This conflicts with findings from the long-term ERO study where the ERO variable did correlate with affect, though this might be explained by the two variables used for each study not representing precisely the same quantity. 

The group of 21 AE (strong EROs) learners from the current study did not perform better in post-tests or delayed post-tests than the rest of the treatment learners, so unexpectedly, carrying out EROs did not serve as a superior method with respect to learning the correct scientific concept when compared with ‘proper’, unbiased experimenting, which puts into doubt the proposed mechanism of ERO → emotion → enhanced learning. On the other hand, these data might imply that after teacher revelation of the scientific theory, previously misconceiving ERO learners have had conceptual barriers removed and so were as likely to achieve favourable conceptual change as more proper experimenters. EROs experienced during the control lessons were more likely to have stayed submerged and thus misconceptions subsequently went uncorrected, accounting for the control groups’ inferior post/delayed post-test results.

With less time being spent on the heavy/fast misconception in the control lessons compared with the treatment, it could be argued that it is of no surprise the latter group would perform better at post-test, and the reasons for success lie with other pedagogical features of MI lessons, not being related at all to differences in emotional elicitation. This view of a non-affectual mechanism appears to be supported by the fact that treatment pupils failed to report generally greater emotion totals than control. Nevertheless, the most emotional pupils also demonstrated more learning in the medium term - a finding peculiar to treatment lessons only – which is compelling, and supported by data from an earlier study (Author, 2006), so it is argued that at least part of the success of the treatment lessons is down to the proposed model,

ERO → emotion → enhanced learning

It seems that although both treatment and control participants experienced intense emotions during the study, with some of the former group, affectual arousal was utilised to positively influence performance. 

Of course, there might well be concurrent or even alternative agents of causation. It must be remembered that the control lesson was a ‘typical’ science practical where normally little time would be spent on the heavy/fast misconception, so findings at least imply the worth of extending the exposure given to pupils with regard to this incorrect, recalcitrant idea. Further research may shed more light on this issue, though whatever the reasons for success, it remains undeniable that since superior gains persisted two and three years after initial exposure, the MI approach to practical work has demonstrable power.

One might expect the brighter students to fare better in the written pre, post and delayed post-tests. Ross and Law (2003) assumed that a year 11 class from their study exhibited less misconceptions partly due to their above average ability; Lawson and Thompson (1988) on the other hand found factors such as mental capacity and verbal intelligence had very little or no effect on the frequency of misconceptions. Findings from the experiment phase of the current research substantiate the former study, with more able pupils tending to choose the scientifically acceptable answer during the pre-test. Post-test results however, show that pupils of all abilities were equally likely to gain the correct answer, indicating that in the short term at least, conceptual change had occurred with less able individuals who had initially misconceived during the pre-test. It is postulated that EROs undertaken during the lesson by this lower ability group facilitated the process. 

Six weeks after the experiments, globally, the delayed post-test results reverted back to an ability-mediated pattern, with the brighter pupils faring better;​[11]​ this was also the case with the 3-year post-test. It appears that the reason why short-term gains demonstrated at post-test by less able learners were not sustained was connected with an inadequate ability to recall distant memories of the lesson, ensuing in a reversion back to the initial misconception declared in the pre-test. Analysis revealed that pupils of all abilities choosing a misconception theory in the post and delayed post-tests tended to fall back on the same theory they had chosen in the original pre-test. Indeed, Claxton (1986) comments that generally, retrieval of a concept is more difficult than acquisition, and just because one learns or understands a new concept that is not the end of the matter, as recall of long-standing misconceptions is often easier than retrieval of a more recently-assimilated theory. The link that was established between low ability and EROs during the long-term study was not verified in the current research, as the AE (strongly EROing) group was of equivalent ability to others in the sample, possibly due to low sample size (n=52) since the larger main study collected data from 1023 pupils.

Critics might challenge the validity of the assumption that a single multiple-choice question fully assesses whether successful conceptual change has occurred, and that further and detailed examination of pupils’ concepts is necessary in order to show a definite and lasting rejection of the heavy/light misconception. Although this cannot be disputed, as discussed previously the measure of achievement utilised by the current research was pragmatic, taking the form of success in answering questions during formal examinations such as KS3 testing and GCSE. Failure in these contexts represents an immediate and damaging effect of this misconception, contributing against progression in school science thus having consequences for further access to science education and future career choice. Since pre and post-test questions undertaken within this study resembled those encountered during formal exams, it seems fair to assume that pupils who were successful in pre and post-testing would be likely to similarly achieve well when answering questions that address this concept at KS3/GCSE.

It is intended that future publications will report other aspects of the long-term ERO study (Author, 2006), of which the experimental phase reported in the current article represents a subordinate part. Findings are derived from a detailed exploration into EROing behaviour, and will focus on multivariate associations of a plethora of factors, the reasons why learners ERO, individual differences between EROers and non-EROers, and relating conclusions to the developmental psychology paradigm in order to generate a causal model. A central aspect that was not explicitly dealt with in the current experimental study is that of social influences on learning during MI lessons, particularly how the theory-choices of other participants influence data collection and inference making.

Summary, conclusions and implications
In all three experiments undertaken, at the time of the post-test significantly more pupils in the treatment groups were aligned to the scientific concept when compared with control group pupils, thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected. Post-experimental gains continued into both the medium and long term, and findings contribute to the literature debate that considers the success of practical work in augmenting substantive theory. Since the control lessons corresponded to a form of ‘traditional’ school science, deficiencies of this contemporary pedagogy in correcting the heavy-fast misconception were apparent.

The brighter pupils performed better at pre-test, although ability was not a mediating factor at post-test or delayed post-test with the treatment pupils. Despite some contradictory data, the tentative claim that committing EROs triggered affectual responses, enhancing engagement and meaningful learning was supported by the finding that experiencing emotion during MI lessons was associated with superior medium-term recall, as indicated by performance at delayed post-test six weeks after the event. The three MI lessons were consistently effective in promoting conceptual change across the ability range in the short term at least, though had mixed results in the medium term. These data add to and confirm the conclusions of previous workers that infer the presentation of anomalous data has positive effects on learning (e.g. Adey, 1992), and the issue of expectation-related observation in school science remains largely unexplored, representing a fertile area for further research. The human tendency to still believe one’s original idea is the right choice in the face of increasing doubt will be familiar to readers on introspection, and findings from this research suggest that this egocentric and normally obstructive inclination might, if generated with care and aforethought be put to good use.

These findings, particularly the fact that pupils still did significantly better two and three years after exposure to a single lesson show what is possible if attempts are made to trigger learners’ emotions during science lessons. Currently, data from the developmental and experimental psychology paradigms are largely ignored in curriculum design, and vital research on cognitive entities and processes, principally emotion, remain hidden gems to educationalists. Making the effort to engage by arousing emotion in pupils would surely pay dividends motivationally as well as attainment-wise. That in the short and medium terms less able learners performed as well as their higher-ability peers implies the MI approach is able to inspire students who are traditionally the least engaged.
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Think about how you felt when you were told the correct answer, and tick the appropriate box next to each statement: 

	I felt this strongly	I felt this slightly	I did not feel this at all
I felt proud of myself when I was right			
I felt embarrassed when I was wrong			
I felt disappointed when I was wrong			
I was pleased to be right			
It did not bother me that I was wrong.			
I felt excited when I was waiting to be told about the answer.			
I was surprised to be wrong, because I thought I was right			
I really wanted to be right			
I was afraid of getting the answer wrong in case I looked foolish.			


















Figure 7: Temporal progress of treatment and control groups.






Particulars	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Year group	Year 7 	Year 6 	Year 6 
Number of participants in treatment class	27	27	25
Number of participants in control class	26	28	25
Raw results (correct/incorrect)	Treatment pre-test Control pre-test	0/273/23	0/271/27	8/173/22
	Treatment post-testControl post-test	19/67/18	25/21/27	23/27/18
	Treatment delayed post-testControl delayed post-test	18/96/15	19/514/9	18/66/19
	Treatment 2nd delayed post-testControl 2nd delayed post-test	13/1011/12	14/0911/13	XX
Pre/post-test comparisons	Treatment group pre/post-test gains	+76%****	+93%***	+60%***
	Control group pre/post-test gains	+16%	0%	+16%
	Treatment/control group post-test results difference	x2= 9.70**	x2= 40.20****	x2= 18.75****
Pre/delayed post-test comparisons	Treatment group pre/delayed post-test gains	+67%****	+79%***	+44%*
	Control group pre/delayed post-test gains	+29%	+58%***	+12%
	Treatment/control group delayed post-test results difference	x2= 5.42*	x2= 1.11	x2= 11.52***
	Treatment group pre/second delayed post-test gains	+57%****	+61%****	X
	Control group pre/second delayed post-test gains	+36%*	+42%**	X
	Treatment/control group second delayed post-test results difference	x2= 1.23	x2=0.548	X





































Learners look at data and make a final choice










Learners carry out four mini-experiments arranged as a circus that use gravity as a theme























































^1	  For example, the infamous twin studies conducted by Sir Cyril Burt on the inheritance of IQ.
^2	  The threshold for perceiving mass differences lies at around 10% (Gordon, 1989).
^3	  The precise design and final content of MIs lean heavily on conceptual change theory; further, detailed elucidations of MIs are considered not relevant to the current context, and plan to be presented in subsequent publications.
^4	  Theory in this sense signifies the idea(s)/conceptual frameworks held by an individual relevant to the phenomenon under investigation, for instance heavier objects will always fall more quickly than lighter ones. Theory can give rise during experimentation to anticipation of a specific result – the heavy marble is going to hit the ground before the light marble.
^5	  Absolute EROing.
^6	  Cognitive Ability Test mean SAS score.
^7	  Taken by year 9 pupils (ages 13-14) in England.
^8	  Taken by year 11 pupils (ages 15-16) in England.
^9	  With Experiment Two at the time of the delayed post-test despite the treatment group displaying a numerically superior performance than control this difference was no longer statistically significant.
^10	  Represented by the AE variable.
^11	  Although within the MI group the less ables were still achieving at the same level as the others.
^12	  Note that 	* = α < 0.05; ** = α < 0.01; *** = α < 0.001; **** = α < 0.0001.
